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'lawbreaking', 'malefaction', 'misdeed', 'sin', 'offense', 'trespass', 'violation', 'wrongdoing'. To transgress is, at its simplest, is "to do something that is not allowed"
1 .
In a human-constructed world, animals are often deemed to be doing something that is not allowed, even where it is an activity essential for survival, such as foraging for food, excreting waste, seeking a mate, constructing a home and raising young. The story of bats in suburban Australia is one example of an animal whose daily life constitutes a set of activities deemed unacceptable because of their smell, noise and potential risk of disease to humans; hence, many argue that bats should not be permitted within spaces of human habitation 2 . Transgression is therefore a useful concept with which to explore the spatial and material impacts of human rule-making about nonhumans. The boundaries that construct transgression may be physical, cultural or regulatory, but they are human- The consequence of transgression by dingoes on Fraser Island can be death, most often of the dingoes, and occasionally of humans. Nonetheless the history of dingohuman interactions also presents a valuable example of a growing human knowledge of 'dingo worlds' and dingoes' diverse relations with humans as a 'trickster', a sheepkiller", a 'real special thing', or a domestic pet 3 . We argue that encounters with dingoes, either directly, or indirectly through sharing knowledge, can form the basis of an ethics that resituates the dingo outside the transgression discourse, requires a greater openness to understanding the dingoes' 'standpoint', and guides humans towards a less punitive and more informed way of living alongside the dingo. … what is being advocated … is an interspecies contact or symbiogenesis based upon a more convivial, less fixedly human and more risky approach to boundaries 4 .
The question of how humans can live more compassionately alongside animals, or at least with reduced levels of harm to animals, has been addressed extensively within geography 5 and in other disciplines such as anthropology 6 , sociology 7 and within environmental histories and philosophy 8 . Responses to such a question are often grounded in ethics, including animal rights advocacy 9 , and canvas not only the sharing of space by humans and their 'companion species', but also with those that are 'incompanionate' 10 -"forms of life with which interspecies relating may not be so obvious or comfortable" 11 , such as rats and viruses.
Human constructed restrictions or barriers to animal movement, both produce and enforce classification of different animals as pets, pest or vermin 12 . Even animal protection and anti-cruelty legislation privileges human needs, convenience and comfort over those of animals, differentiating between a dog as a 'pet', a certified 'working dog' or a 'stray' 13 , and the ethico-legal treatment of animals varies greatly between companion animals and 'consumption' animals 14 . to be allowed kill permits to stop flying foxes repeatedly decimating their crops… …Leading the call for a "serious culling program" is federal Member for Kennedy, Bob Katter, who claims talk is being dominated by a "clear-cut value system that puts the lives of bats higher than the lives of human beings".
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The animal movements and occupation of space that qualify as transgressions change over time, as can be seen in the emergence of the nineteenth century "sanitary city"
described by Atkins, where particular animal species were first classified as vermin 16 . In the non-urban settings of outback Australia:
[c]amels are now referred to as "humped pests," "a plague," "real danger" … and "menacing" … These accusations lie in stark contrast to the praise laid upon Similarly, the cane toad in Australia has been transformed from the sugarcane farmer's weapon against cane beetle to the ultimate transgressor of 'wild' spaces, ugly, toxic and destructive 18 . These shifting boundaries and classifications reveal animal transgression as a marker of an anthropocentrically constructed landscape that changes according to the shifting needs and desires of humans.
In this paper, we take up a point emphasised recently by Hodgetts and Lorimer 19 , that animal geographies are multiple, with different topologies that are not necessarily commensurate with those of humans. Topologies here is used in Shields' 20 sense to mean conceptualizations of space in terms of significant connections and relationships within the space, foregrounding some and backgrounding others, rather than 'geometries' that focus on distances and shapes. For any space, there are likely to be "multiple, conflicting spatialisations that intersect, usually remaining separate but at certain times and places breaking in on each other" 21 . Finding ways to understand how topologies differ between species, for example through ethology, "helps acknowledge intersections, absences, incommensurabilities and discordances within and between the multiple ways and forms of being in the world" 22 . In the examples To discuss transgression is to discuss the boundaries and borders that make transgression possible. These borders, suggests Castree, may most obviously be those political borders defined by national governments, but more broadly are those "conceptual cuts" that separate 'inside' from 'outside' or 'out of place'. They occur in any arena where "dividing lines are drawn and come to have material efficacy."
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In this paper, we are concerned with borders in a more-than-human world, and in particular with re-examining the idea of animal transgression across human-defined boundaries. We argue that human construction and enforcement of such boundaries reflect an asymmetry of power founded on the principle of human exceptionalismthe presumption of an "unbridgeable hiatus" between humans and nonhumans 24 . This conceit, "keeps us searching in vain for what barricades us from, rather than bonds us to, our co-habitants on earth" 25 . One of the ways in which this search for separation takes form is in the construction of human space and boundaries that exclude animals and their activities. The threat imposed by animal transgression across these boundaries is thus a threat to a topology that reflects and represents the distinction between human and nonhuman and the privileging of the human. From such encounters it is possible to imagine a different way for humans and dingoes to share space "without interfering with each other" 32 .
A short history of dingoes on Fraser Island
The dingo 'problem' on Fraser Island: the transgression discourse People who visit Fraser Island for the first time often struggle to find the words to describe the beauty of this magical island. But also animal life, especially the 230 species of birds, Australia's purest dingo and many other species contribute to the unique island environment 33 .
Fraser Island, located near Australia's eastern coast in the State of Queensland (see Map below), is the world's largest sand island, over 120 kilometres long, and since The conceptual boundaries between 'natural' and habituated behaviour, however, become blurred when humans are involved in reinforcing 'wild' behaviours 38 .
Strategies directed at reinstating dingoes' 'natural' fear of humans and de-habituating 
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The reporting of another Fraser Island dingo attack in 2011 reflects a continued management approach of killing 'problem dingoes' while shifting some responsibility to humans: Management] advised all visitors to the island to be "dingo smart":
"Our ambition is to keep dingoes wild on Fraser Island which is a wild place," he said. "One of the implications of that is that people need to take personal responsibility for going to wild places and on Fraser Island that includes being 'dingo smart'".
Being 'dingo-smart' however has a history that began long before the Department's education and awareness campaign.
Dingo-human relations over time
Across Australia, Aboriginal elders have recalled raising dingoes as pets to protect children from other dingoes, and early miners and timber-getters also recount positive stories of befriending dingoes 43 . For many Aboriginal people the dingo is part of the Dreaming, "fitted into the wider kinship structure" and buried with ceremony 44 . The wild side of the dingo has also been acknowledged, and its capacity to behave as a … if it is finally accepted that … dingoes naturally have a complex repertoire of behaviours that include symbiotic and predatory associations with humans, then it can be assigned its place on the landscape as a dangerous animal and conserved as such animals are everywhere, with its separation from people given due weight 52 .
Transformative encounters: human mourning and dingo standpoints
After the culling of 31 dingoes on Fraser Island in 2001, there is evidence of a concern that dingoes were "dying because of human mistakes" 53 . The reactions to the culling of the dingoes recorded in a survey by Burns et al 54 included grief and shock: feeling afraid for the dingoes 55 , and sadness at the killing of a "real special thing" 56 . Others saw it immediately as a justice issue, noting that dingoes had been fed by humans and calling for fairness for the dingoes 57 , or described the culling as a tragedy and an incident that was no fault of the dingo 58 . Other responses were more political and directed anger at government and wildlife management, suggesting that the government had simply wanted to be seen to be doing something 59 or that it was people rather than wildlife who needed managing 60 . to a history of dingo-human encounters that reaches beyond the attack incidents described in the media reports and beyond expert explanations for dingo behaviour and advocates' arguments for dingo rights. In their grief and anger, the survey respondents expressed a connection with dingoes that might begin to inform a different kind of ethics in dingo-human relations.
The ethical terrain in dingo-human relations
The killing of dingoes on Fraser Island has been underpinned by definitions of 'natural' dingo behaviours as acceptable when they remain 'in place' (behind boundary fences), and the behaviour of problem -transgressing -dingoes as 'unnatural'. These definitions in turn enable the human act of killing to be ethically justified in that it becomes not simply the killing of animals who transgress 'human' space and threaten humans, but the mercy killing ('euthanasing' 62 ) of 'unnatural' animals who can no longer represent the 'pure', natural dingo and have lost their dingo way. Arguments for killing dingoes also rely on a different conservation principle that values, and hence ethically privileges, the preservation of a species rather than individual animals or populations: the maintenance of a 'generative' heterogeneity in ecosystems and landscapes, rather than specific existing differences between "species, genes, habitats" 65 . Thus the suffering of individual dingoes becomes subsumed in the debate about the dingo as a 'type' of nonhuman, as a 'pure representative' of the species, or as an essential component of the ecosystem; producing and reproducing an ethics of space in which nonhumans may be rendered invisible. The Australian Dingo Conservation Association couches its aims in terms of protecting and conserving "the Australian Dingo" rather than individual dingoes 66 ; elsewhere, the deaths of individual wolves have been made ethically invisible in the same way 67 .
In suggesting that strategies to make dingoes fear humans need to be accompanied by a strategy to make people fear dingoes, Burns et al call for greater recognition of the encounters that generated mourning, anger and fear for the dingoes after the incident in 2001. Instone suggests that this is part of a bigger conceptual shift: that each respectful encounter in which the 'trickiness' of dingoes is accepted and negotiated "refocuses attention on the transformative power of the encounter between humans and non-humans in the making of Australian nature" 69 .
Even encounters that are less direct can produce a transformation in human-animal relations. The resort guest quoted above 70 who regrets the loss of "a real special thing", may indeed be referring to 'the dingo' as a type or as a species, and may not have had an encounter with the elusive dingo; the statement is nonetheless an expression of sadness that responds to the killing of 31 individual dingoes. Other comments from residents and tourism employees also refer to a generic 'dingo' -who is fed by humans, whose future is feared for, who needs to be managed less than humans do -but they too are expressing grief and outrage at the deaths of individual dingoes. Later in this paper we return to the ethical distinction between concern for a collective and concern for individual animals. The slow co-evolution of a different kind of relationship between humans and dingoes is reflected partly in the concern that authorities have to demonstrate that there is a declining number of dingoes being killed (even when, as indicated in the Figure 2 above, the evidence for a consistent decline is not strong 71 ). However it is also reflected more positively in the attempts that have been made to achieve an understanding of dingo worlds, of the way 'transgressions' are constructed by humans and the possibility that transgressions might occur in both directions. Developing a more equitable human topology for Fraser Island will, as Parker notes, take time, and meanwhile the 'dingo-proof' fence continues to provide a physical boundary between tourists and dingoes 72 .
Developing ethical topologies: staying in the open and paying attention
Shifting towards a less anthropocentric sharing of space by humans and animals is therefore not merely a matter of knowing more about animals -"producing better and better or more accurate representations, as if we can take preexisting identities and bring them into the conversation"; it is, as Hinchliffe et al have noted, rather about changing our engagements with animals 73 . Dingoes and humans living well together on
Fraser Island, and in all of the spaces they inhabit, will emerge from new understandings of dingo worlds and dingo standpoints that resituate the dingo outside 
Encounters: where human and dingo topologies intersect
Histories of human-nonhuman relations acknowledge a more symmetrical coconstitution of space by humans and nonhumans 74 . In a study of tourists whalewatching and swimming with dolphins, Cloke and Perkins 75 note the contribution of the animals themselves, through both carefully staged and unanticipated actions, to "the changing nature of places and … the performances which help to define those places" 76 . We need to consider, argues Clark, "not only how nonhumans make worlds of their own, but how they provide worlds for others 77 , including humans. Humandolphin interactions allow familiarity with the animals to grow through sharing of spaces 78 . Through co-constituting spaces in ways that enhance humans' enjoyment, animals perform the opposite of transgression; rather than breaching a human-defined space, they help to define it.
Considering animals as co-constituents of space has ethical and practical possibilities beyond the wild encounter, for example, for shared urban topologies that include conceptions of 'the zoöpolis' 79 , and the 'living city' 80 , where sites of significant interaction include parks, abandoned land, public infrastructure spaces, and waterways that cut across the established spatial divisions "between civic and wild, Encounters with animals can give us time to see the animal's 'face' 83 , and the possibility of an engagement based on empathy and an understanding of 'animal' standpoints' 84 . Haraway has argued that humans need to have a certain regard 85 for an animal in order to give it a face; Parker notes in her discussion on dingoes that this regard is reciprocal:
Many writers have commented on the moment when an animal returns their gaze… The dingo, pushing her paws through the sand to locate the trap, wants to live…
Without the barrier of a denigrating discourse, it would be hard to look a trapped dingo in the eye 86 .
Such encounters with animals appear to induce an empathy or awareness that translates into a 'care ethic' 87 , an awareness that Segerdahl likens to "a moral wound
[that] had been opened that ought never to heal. We have become vulnerable to what I, at this moment, want to call, the other animals" 88 . For Karlsson, encounter is "the basic, moral event", where asymmetries of power imply "an increased responsibility 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 60 .
Paying attention and staying in the open
Our thinking on intersecting topologies can be extended to enrol diverse spatial 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 60 Given the flying foxes' intense determination to return to or remain in camps where they have mated and given birth, the experience of those who return to find that the home camp has been rendered uninhabitable or even razed must be stressful and demoralizing in the extreme. … [F]lying foxes inhabit not just trees but worlds of meaning… 97 To be re-enchanted by the other, and recognize its expressiveness, involves paying attention to other lives and worlds, using for example some of the methods of tracing nonhuman topologies described by Hodgetts and Lorimer 98 . It includes too the kind of attention paid in Whatmore's stories of 'becoming elephant', 99 and in Darwin's study of earthworms 100 . It is "getting 'dirty and knowledgeable' in order to know and talk about animals responsibly" 101 .
This The move away from a worldview based on human exceptionalism is a form of 'giving up' not only conventional modes of inquiry, but the self: "to cast oneself … with some ways of life and not others" 105 . In their study of water voles, Hinchliffe et al 106 found
that paying attention to detail produces another world, one that is understood with more than simply the senses:
In practice, the pictures and written texts are woven together with the traces, tracks, and mammals to form a complex of writings. Our eyes (and to a lesser extent our noses) were being trained to recognise distinctions that were formerly invisible to us. The pictures, field signs, and conversations were The authors note that they were learning "to be affected" and that the idea of faithfully representing the water voles was being replaced with a form of "creative address" to them 108 : "allowing others, of all shapes and sizes, to make a difference to the process of knowing" 109 .
What is needed, suggests Lorimer, is "a humble willingness to put one's knowledge at risk in the process of learning to be affected by the phenomena under investigation" No less than the unbalancing of our relationship with nature, the offer of helpwithout expectation of return or recompense -to those who have been laid low by the ordinary chaos of terrestrial existence also upsets the assumption of coconstitutive relations -and draws us deeper into the issue of how to live as best we can in an inherently precarious physical reality 113 . … etiquette involves reciprocity of seeing, touching, and speaking with the other, a bodily invitation to interact by welcoming gesture, following the rules of courtesy and trust, allowing the space to respond (or not) as a journey in discovery of the other 118 .
Forms of writing are still being developed to convey the kind of knowledge that emerges from encounter and the "slowed-down attentiveness" that is different from the researcher's usual observation and categorization 119 or the dominant definitions and responses typical of a discourse of transgression. An example of such experimental These short pieces often describe an experience, or a notion, or a thought that secretly drives our work but cannot be digested completely in scholarly form.
These interludes reveal animal studies to transgress not only disciplinary borders, but also borders between the academic and the personal 121 .
This suggests that in order to situate encounters with nonhumans outside a discourse of transgression -to shape a new topology that takes account of the nonhuman 'standpoint' -humans will need to push beyond existing ethical and scholarly boundaries.
Conclusion
The localised histories of dingo-human encounter, and the individual responses to dingo deaths on Fraser Island, profoundly influence the ways in which humans choose to interact with the dingo. This paper is part of a wider and continuing project by many to write about such encounters, to inform new ethical topologies that can acknowledge multiplicity, and guide future interactions with animals more generously.
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